Bulletin of the American Physical Society
APS April Meeting 2018
Volume 63, Number 4
Saturday–Tuesday, April 14–17, 2018; Columbus, Ohio
Session C06: Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile DefenseInvited
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Sponsoring Units: FPS Chair: Joel Primack, University of California, Santa Cruz Room: B130 |
Saturday, April 14, 2018 1:30PM - 2:06PM |
C06.00001: North Korean Long-Range Ballistic Missiles and US Missile Defenses Invited Speaker: Ted Postol On Tuesday, November 28, 2017, North Korea launched a missile called the Hwasong-15, which shows astonishing technological advances relative to earlier long-range North Korean missiles. The first stage of the Hwasong-15 uses a full RD-250 rocket motor unit with a single turbopump driving two thrust chambers giving a sea-level thrust of about 80 tons. This and related rocket motors were almost certainly obtained from Russian or Ukrainian sources. The motors on the first stage are mounted on gimbals, which eliminates the need for vernier control engines. This innovation both increases the overall reliability of the missile and frees up weight for the final payload. The second stage uses a high-performance rocket motor that has not been seen before in North Korean missiles. The characteristics of the second stage closely match those of the second stage of the Soviet ICBM known in the West as the SS-11, which was built in very large numbers during the early part of the Cold War. This talk explains how the North Korean liquid propellant ballistic missile program has been able to advance from its earliest days at an unprecedented rate. The program has received – almost certainly without the knowledge of the Russian government – large amounts of rocket components and expertise, starting from the time of the catastrophic collapse of the Soviet Union and its economy. Another feature of the North Korean program is the startling level of indigenous innovation demonstrated in North Korean ballistic missile designs, which very cleverly use rocket components that were intended for other purposes. This talk will also briefly introduce a missile defense concept that could potentially allow the US to destroy North Korean ICBM-range ballistic missiles while they are in powered flight. Unlike the current Ground-Based Missile Defense (GMD) this defense can be built with existing demonstrated technologies and does not require violation of fundamental physical principles to work. [Preview Abstract] |
Saturday, April 14, 2018 2:06PM - 2:42PM |
C06.00002: Missile Defense and Space Weapons Invited Speaker: Laura Grego Missile defenses and space weapons have always been closely related technologically, but two geopolitical trends now make this relationship critically important. First, while the United States has had an ambitious missile defense program for many years, developments in North Korean nuclear and missile programs are providing justification for enormous budget increases to build more of existing systems as well as new types of systems. Second, as satellites have become critical to military, civil, and economic life, the long-held norms against destroying an adversary's satellites and against placing weapons in orbit are under increasing pressure. Recent policy directs the Pentagon to begin building both offensive and defensive space systems, and states that space is a war-fighting domain, just as air, land, and sea. Defense systems designed to target ballistic missiles have inherent capabilities as anti-satellite weapons. The existing US ground- and sea-based missile defense systems are projected to grow significantly, and will in theory be able hold at risk nearly all Chinese and Russian satellites in low-earth orbits. China, Russia, and other countries are also developing their own missile defense systems and other means to interfere with satellites, although they are currently much more modest in scope. Additionally, the Pentagon is likely to propose this year to develop a space-based missile defense system. Such a system, requiring hundreds of orbiting interceptors to target a few launching missiles, would be extremely costly and inherently fragile. It would also be strategically disastrous, justifying adversaries to develop new nuclear weapons and delivery systems and damaging prospects for future arms control agreements. Space-based interceptors would have powerful anti-satellite capabilities, as they could reach geosynchronous orbits. Even a few interceptors in the guise of a testbed would introduce dedicated destructive weapons to orbit for the first time. [Preview Abstract] |
Saturday, April 14, 2018 2:42PM - 3:18PM |
C06.00003: US Nuclear Weapons Modernization Invited Speaker: Roy Schwitters The US last detonated a nuclear weapon in 1992 in an underground test in Nevada. By 1994, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched its science-based stockpile stewardship program (SSP) designed specifically to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of US nuclear weapons without underground nuclear testing. Today, 24 years later, the scientists and engineers at NNSA's national laboratories and associated facilities, have succeeded at this task by a thorough modernization of tools, methods, and ideas about stewarding nuclear weapons. Key enablers were development and employment of specific new experimental capabilities, creation of modern, 3D weapon simulation codes, and investment in high-end supercomputers. This was also a period when cold-war stockpiles declined in size and military requirements for nuclear performance were stable. Looking ahead to the next generation of SSP, issues of responsiveness, agility, and efficiency of the nuclear weapons enterprise led the departments of Defense and Energy to seek a stockpile with fewer weapon types, while maintaining current capabilities. Called the ``3$+$2'' strategy, it envisages three sets of ``interoperable'' nuclear components serving both Air Force ICBMs and Navy SLBMs, and two air- delivered weapons. However, nuclear threats worldwide are quite different today compared to 1992-94, with more players and, potentially, greater threats. Nuclear policy is being reexamined by the new administration. Will ``3$+$2'' remain the program of record or be replaced? What is known is our SSP approach, without nuclear testing, works. High performance computing may experience limits to growth, while new experimental approaches may be coming into focus to address key performance questions definitively in non-explosive nuclear experiments. Continuous improvement--- modernization---of SSP will remain crucial to US deterrence and, perhaps someday, control of these threats to humanity. [Preview Abstract] |
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