APS April Meeting 2018
Volume 63, Number 4
Saturday–Tuesday, April 14–17, 2018;
Columbus, Ohio
Session C06: Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Defense
1:30 PM–3:18 PM,
Saturday, April 14, 2018
Room: B130
Sponsoring
Unit:
FPS
Chair: Joel Primack, University of California, Santa Cruz
Abstract ID: BAPS.2018.APR.C06.2
Abstract: C06.00002 : Missile Defense and Space Weapons
2:06 PM–2:42 PM
Preview Abstract
Abstract
Author:
Laura Grego
(Union of Concerned Scientists)
Missile defenses and space weapons have always been closely related
technologically, but two geopolitical trends now make this relationship
critically important. First, while the United States has had an ambitious
missile defense program for many years, developments in North Korean nuclear
and missile programs are providing justification for enormous budget
increases to build more of existing systems as well as new types of systems.
Second, as satellites have become critical to military, civil, and economic
life, the long-held norms against destroying an adversary's satellites and
against placing weapons in orbit are under increasing pressure. Recent
policy directs the Pentagon to begin building both offensive and defensive
space systems, and states that space is a war-fighting domain, just as air,
land, and sea.
Defense systems designed to target ballistic missiles have inherent
capabilities as anti-satellite weapons. The existing US ground- and
sea-based missile defense systems are projected to grow significantly, and
will in theory be able hold at risk nearly all Chinese and Russian
satellites in low-earth orbits. China, Russia, and other countries are also
developing their own missile defense systems and other means to interfere
with satellites, although they are currently much more modest in scope.
Additionally, the Pentagon is likely to propose this year to develop a
space-based missile defense system. Such a system, requiring hundreds of
orbiting interceptors to target a few launching missiles, would be extremely
costly and inherently fragile. It would also be strategically disastrous,
justifying adversaries to develop new nuclear weapons and delivery systems
and damaging prospects for future arms control agreements. Space-based
interceptors would have powerful anti-satellite capabilities, as they could
reach geosynchronous orbits. Even a few interceptors in the guise of a
testbed would introduce dedicated destructive weapons to orbit for the first
time.
To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2018.APR.C06.2