Bulletin of the American Physical Society
APS March Meeting 2019
Volume 64, Number 2
Monday–Friday, March 4–8, 2019; Boston, Massachusetts
Session A63: Evolutionary and Ecological Dynamics I: Evolution
8:00 AM–11:00 AM,
Monday, March 4, 2019
BCEC Room: 259A
Sponsoring Units: DBIO GSNP
Chair: Jeffrey Gore, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract: A63.00012 : The Replicator Dynamics for Multilevel Selection in Evolutionary Games*
10:36 AM–10:48 AM
When average payoff of groups is maximized by all-cooperator groups, steady state composition ranges from all-defector groups when individual-level selection dominates to all-cooperator groups when group-level selection dominates. When group payoff is maximized by a mix of cooperators and defectors, then the steady state features a fewer cooperators than required for the optimal mix, even in the limit where group-level selection is infinitely stronger than individual-level selection. In such cases, the conflict between the two levels of selection cannot be decoupled, and cooperation cannot survive when between-group competition favors perfect coexistence of cooperators and defectors.
*I acknowledge support from NSF grants DMS-1514606 and GEO-1211972.
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