Schrodinger's Technology is Here and Not: Quantum Technology Implications for Nuclear Deterrence

Many nuclear policy experts classify quantum technologies as "emerging" or "disruptive" technologies that have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence or fundamentally reshape deterrence requirements. For example, they caution that quantum computers could enable interference with encrypted command and control systems, quantum communication techniques could afford bolstered security of information transmission, and quantum sensors could enhance detection of mobile delivery systems that assure means of retaliation. If ongoing quantum research and development confers these technologies and capabilities, the consequences for existing nuclear force structure and deterrence policies would be profound. However, there has been a lack of critical, technical analysis to verify or refute whether these claims are realistic and at what timeframes such breakthroughs should be expected. As a result, policymakers with limited technical backgrounds are influenced by these assertions, regardless of whether they are feasible, when making decisions on nuclear force structure buildup, deterrence postures, and engagement in arms control. This presentation leverages scientific literature to survey technically-feasible quantum innovations that could impact nuclear deterrence and critique inflated assertions that are stoking concern among policymakers. It will also propose opportunities to enhance communication on quantum research and development progress across technical and non-technical audiences to ensure more informed and realistic expectations.