Bulletin of the American Physical Society
APS April Meeting 2017
Volume 62, Number 1
Saturday–Tuesday, January 28–31, 2017; Washington, DC
Session C7: Nuclear Testing Limitations and Monitoring Low Level RadioactivityInvited
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Sponsoring Units: FPS Chair: Thomas Cochran, Natural Resources Defense Council Room: Delaware A |
Saturday, January 28, 2017 1:30PM - 2:06PM |
C7.00001: Nuclear Weapon Testing Limitations and International Security Invited Speaker: Pierce S. Corden For over 50 years stopping nuclear weapon tests has been sought to support achieving international security without nuclear weapons. Testing is the critical path beyond primitive fission devices, e.g. to develop thermonuclear weapons, reduce weight and volume and increase yield. The 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts considered ways to verify a test ban. With then-limitations on seismology, and lack of in-country monitoring and on-site inspections, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits testing only in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, and is verified by National Technical Means. The US and USSR agreed to a limit of 150 kilotons on underground explosions in the 1970s-80s. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear explosions. Its International Monitoring System – seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide sensors – is being used, and has easily detected testing by the DPRK. On-site inspections will be available under an in-force Treaty. A 2012 National Academy report concludes that cheating attempts would not undermine U.S. security, and the program for monitoring and extending the life of US weapons has succeeded since US testing ceased in 1992. [Preview Abstract] |
Saturday, January 28, 2017 2:06PM - 2:42PM |
C7.00002: Nuclear Weapon Testing Limitations and Monitoring Low Level Radioactivity Invited Speaker: Jay Zucca Collection of radioactive aerosols or noble gasses from a nuclear explosion is normally considered necessary to identify an explosion as nuclear---particularly for smaller explosions. Radionuclides can be collected at the particulate or noble gas stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS) or during an on-site inspection (OSI) which could be authorized under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty after its entry into force. Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere will release large amounts of radionuclides which will be detected by the IMS with high probability. For detection of underground nuclear explosions, radionuclides need to be released to the atmosphere by a subsurface transport mechanism that can range from a dynamic venting of a major fraction the nuclear explosion fission products to only a small amount of radioactive noble gasses. Small releases may only be detectable during an OSI. Modern detection systems are very sensitive and detect background sources of radionuclides in addition to nuclear explosion related radionuclides. Techniques which require the measurement of several isotopes may be necessary to discriminate between benign and nuclear explosion-related radionuclides.\\ \\In collaboration with: Charles Carrigan, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Brian Milbrath, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. [Preview Abstract] |
Saturday, January 28, 2017 2:42PM - 3:18PM |
C7.00003: The CTBT's International Monitoring System and On-Site Inspection Capabilities: a Status Report Invited Speaker: Lassina Zerbo At its 20th anniversary the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has now gathered 183 State Signatories, of which 166 have ratified. But 8 States remain to ratify before we reach entry into force. In the meantime the CTBT verification regime has accumulated two decades worth of experience, and has achieved proven results. The regime includes a global system for monitoring the earth, the oceans and the atmosphere and an on-site inspection (OSI) capability. It uses seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide technologies to do so. More than 90\% of the 337 facilities of the International Monitoring System (IMS) have been installed and are sending data to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, Austria for processing. These IMS data along with IDC processed and reviewed products are available to all States that have signed the Treaty. The monitoring system has been put to test and demonstrated its effectiveness by detecting, locating and reporting on the DPRK announced nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013 and twice in 2016. In addition to detecting radioxenon consistent with the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2013 the IMS radionuclide network also added value in the response to the tragic events in Fukushima in 2011. We continue to find new civil and scientific applications of the IMS that are made available to the international community to deal with major societal issues such as sustainable development, disaster risk reduction and climate change. OSI capabilities continue to be developed and tested. The Integrated Field Exercise in Jordan in 2014 demonstrated that they have reached a high level of operational readiness. The CTBT has been a catalyst for the development of new scientific fields in particular in the noble gas monitoring technology. CTBTO seeks to continuously improve its technologies and methods through interaction with the scientific community. [Preview Abstract] |
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