Bulletin of the American Physical Society
2008 APS April Meeting and HEDP/HEDLA Meeting
Volume 53, Number 5
Friday–Tuesday, April 11–15, 2008; St. Louis, Missouri
Session X6: Space Debris |
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Sponsoring Units: FPS Chair: Benn Tannenbaum, AAAS Room: Hyatt Regency St. Louis Riverfront (formerly Adam's Mark Hotel), Promenade D |
Tuesday, April 15, 2008 1:30PM - 2:06PM |
X6.00001: An Introduction to Space Debris Invited Speaker: Space debris is any human-made object in orbit that no longer serves a useful purpose, including defunct satellites, discarded equipment and rocket stages, and fragments from the breakup of satellites and rocket stages. It is a concern because--due to its very high speed in orbit--even relatively small pieces can damage or destroy satellites in a collision. Since debris at high altitudes can stay in orbit for decades or longer, it accumulates as more is produced and the risk of collisions with satellites grows. Since there is currently no effective way to remove large amounts of debris from orbit, controlling the production of debris is essential for preserving the long-term use of space. Today there are 860 active satellites in orbit, supporting a wide range of civil and military uses. The 50 years of space activity since the launch of Sputnik 1 has also resulted in well over half a million pieces of orbiting debris larger than 1 cm in size. There are two main sources of space debris: (1) routine space activity and the accidental breakup of satellites and stages placed in orbit by such activity, and (2) the testing or use of destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that physically collide with satellites at high speed. The international community is attempting to reduce the first category by developing strict guidelines to limit the debris created as a result of routine space activities. However, the destruction of a single large spy satellite by an ASAT weapon could double the total amount of large debris in low earth orbit, and there are currently no international restrictions on these systems. This talk will give an introduction to what's in space, the origins of space debris, efforts to stem its growth, the threat it poses to satellites in orbit, and the long-term evolution of the debris population. [Preview Abstract] |
Tuesday, April 15, 2008 2:06PM - 2:42PM |
X6.00002: Considering the Consequences of Space Warfare in the Geosynchronous Region Invited Speaker: Today in the United States there is a rejuvenated push for space weapons and the restraint that was exercised regarding the military use of space during the Cold War is notably absent. This talk aims to demonstrate that space is an unacceptable arena for warfare based on the notion that fragment-generating attacks in space could cause irreparable damage to the hundreds of satellites orbiting the Earth, particularly in the invaluable geosynchronous region. In an effort to highlight the drawbacks of space weapons, a simulation entitled GeoPell modelled the consequences of a kinetic energy ``pellet cluster'' attack initiated at the geostationary altitude. The worst-case estimate predicted by GeoPell indicated that within two years of placing the cluster of one million pellets into a retrograde geostationary orbit and subsequently dispersing the pellets with a bursting charge, almost every geosynchronous satellite would be destroyed. Thus, the technical consequences of this hypothetical space attack suggest space weapons and warfare should be avoided due to the detrimental effects such weapons would have on the orbital environment. Cooperative restraint-based measures, possibly in the form of a ban on space weapons testing and deployment, are necessary to salvage the final frontier. [Preview Abstract] |
Tuesday, April 15, 2008 2:42PM - 3:18PM |
X6.00003: China's ASAT Weapon: Capabilities and the Potential Threat Invited Speaker: Much has been said about China's 11 January 2007 test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon but few analysts have based their comments on a scientific determination of the weapons capabilities. This paper presents such an analysis derived from the observed pattern of debris, as observed by NORAD and posted on-line by NASA. It is clear that this was a direct hit-to-kill weapon (as opposed to a fragmentation-type explosive warhead), it massed about 600 kg, and was capable of accelerations of at least 6 Gs. It can be inferred with a reasonable degree of confidence that it used an on-board optical tracker, most likely operating in visible light. Furthermore, since the closing speed between the target satellite and the interceptor was 8 km/s during the test, this weapon could be used to attack satellites at higher altitude orbits, such as NAVSTAR/GPS and geostationary satellites that include communications and early warning satellites. This test produced ten times as many pieces of debris as an earlier US hit-to-kill ASAT test which, because of their higher altitudes, will last thousands of years---hundreds of times longer than the debris in the US test. China's test increased the chances of some low earth orbit satellite being hit by a piece of debris by 50{\%}, from about 12{\%} to 18{\%} each year. Given this weapon's capabilities, it is possible to ``war game'' what an all-out Chinese ASAT attack would look like and what responses the US could take. (It is important to emphasize that this is a capabilities-based exercise and not based on Chinese intentions.) If China did launch such an attack, it could eliminate a large fraction of US military satellites in low earth orbit including photo-reconnaissance and electronic intelligence satellites, but not all of them, in the first 24 hours; the requirement that the target satellites be illuminated by the sun limits the attack. Furthermore, the US could maneuver its LEO satellites in the first hours of the attack and greatly complicate the task of their destruction. If coupled by attacks on China's largest radars, the US could save a number of their LEO satellites. China would have to choose to attack either US GPS satellites or communications satellites, but not both, since its launch capabilities are insufficient. If it attacked the GPS constellation, it could not prevent the US from using precision guided munitions. [Preview Abstract] |
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