Session C14: The Author in Dialogue: Steven Weinberg's 'To Explain the World'

Reflections of a whig physicist .

I argue that a whig interpretation, keeping an eye on present knowledge and methods, is appropriate in the history of science.   

Beller Lecture: Is Understanding the Past in Its Own Terms Understanding?

History of Science is in a state of intellectual confusion symbolized by its hostility to what is called “Whig history”. The fundamental issue is whether it is legitimate to use hindsight in the writing of history. In this lecture I will defend retrospective history in three key respects: a) retrospection is generally a legitimate procedure in historical writing, primarily because historical outcomes are often unintended and unpredictable; b) retrospection is particularly legitimate where science is concerned because scientific development is path dependent; c) restrospection is particularly legitimate in history of science because science progresses, and progress can only be identified retrospectively. Defending retrospection is entirely compatible with recognizing that science is culturally specific; thus retrospection need not involve anachronism. See www.inventionofscience.com   

To Explain Copernicus: The Islamic Scientific and Religious Contexts

No one seriously disputes the novelty of Copernicus’s monumental decision to put the Earth in motion or its importance for the development of modern science. But that decision can appear quite different when viewed from the perspective of a modern scientist versus that of a contextualist historian. In his recent book To Explain the World, Prof. Weinberg places great store on what he calls aesthetic criteria for understanding Copernicus’s choice. The historical record, however, is rather ambiguous on the matter, and if anything supports the view that Copernicus came to his aesthetic justifications (such as the beautiful ordering of the planets) after first reaching his heliocentric theory. So if not aesthetics, what did lead him to go against a two-millenium tradition that placed the Earth firmly in the center of the Cosmos? There are no doubt many factors; one of the most intriguing suggestions, well-argued by Noel Swerdlow, is that Copernicus was led to heliocentrism by his rather conservative desire to restore uniform, circular motion to the heavens and remove the irregularities of Ptolemaic astronomy. Swerdlow has also asserted that this has much to do with Islamic predecessors who were attempting to do the same thing, only within a geocentric framework. In this presentation, I will briefly summarize this Islamic scientific context and then explore the religious beliefs that led not only to the questioning of Ptolemaic scientific authority, including his alleged lack of observational diligence, but also ancient philosophical authority, the latter opening up possibilities for alternative cosmologies, at least one of which included the Earth’s motion. Finally, evidence will be presented that connects these Islamic contexts with Copernicus’s theories and justifications.   

The Diagnosis of Error in Histories of Science

Whether and how to diagnose error in the history of science is a contentious issue. For many scientists, diagnosis is appealing because it allows them to discuss how knowledge can progress most effectively. Many historians disagree. They consider diagnosis inappropriate because it may discard features of past actors' thought that are important to understanding it, and may have even been intellectually productive. Ironically, these historians are apt to diagnose flaws in scientists' histories as proceeding from a misguided desire to idealize scientific method, and from their attendant identification of deviations from the ideal as, ipso facto, a paramount source of error in historical science. While both views have some merit, they should be reconciled if a more harmonious and productive relationship between the disciplines is to prevail. In To Explain the World, Steven Weinberg narrates the slow but definite emergence of what we call science from long traditions of philosophical and mathematical thought. This narrative follows in a historiographical tradition charted by historians such as Alexandre Koyre and Rupert Hall about sixty years ago. It is essentially a history of the emergence of reliable (if fallible) scientific method from more error-prone thought. While some historians such as Steven Shapin view narratives of this type as fundamentally error-prone, I do not view such projects as a priori illegitimate. They are, however, perhaps more difficult than Weinberg supposes. In this presentation, I will focus on two of Weinberg's strong historical claims: that physics became detached from religion as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, and that physics proved an effective model for placing other fields on scientific grounds. While I disagree with these claims, they represent at most an overestimation of vintage science's interest in discarding theological questions, and an overestimation of that science's ability to function at all reliably.