APS April Meeting 2012
Volume 57, Number 3
Saturday–Tuesday, March 31–April 3 2012;
Atlanta, Georgia
Session B6: Invited Session: FPS Awards
10:45 AM–12:33 PM,
Saturday, March 31, 2012
Room: Embassy C
Sponsoring
Unit:
FPS
Chair: Pete Zimmerman, King's College, London
Abstract ID: BAPS.2012.APR.B6.1
Abstract: B6.00001 : Joseph A. Burton Forum Award Lecture: Managing Nuclear and Biological Risks: Building Resilience through International Cooperation
10:45 AM–11:21 AM
Preview Abstract
Abstract
Author:
Arian Pregenzer
(Retired, Sandia National Laboratories)
International technical cooperation has long been an important
nonproliferation strategy, especially since the 1990s when cooperative
threat reduction (CTR) to prevent theft or illicit transfer of nuclear
weapons, material and expertise in the former Soviet Union became a keystone
of U.S. policy. The CTR approach expanded to include engagement with
scientists and engineers with expertise relevant to biological and chemical
weapons, and continued in the 2000s with efforts in Iraq and Libya, and
cooperation with a wide range of countries on export control and nuclear and
biological security. In general, the goal of such efforts has been to
prevent proliferation or WMD terrorism. In most cases, the United States (or
the West) defines the threat, and then funds partner countries to implement
solutions.
This presentation will argue that the future requires a new approach.
Nuclear capabilities are more widely available than ever before,
repercussions of the A.Q. Khan network continue to unfurl, and countries
such as the DPRK engage in illicit cooperation. In addition, there has been
a global boom in biotechnology with many nations, particularly across South
and East Asia, investing in the biotech industry as a source of fuels, food,
and materials for their rapidly expanding populations. Compared to the
1990s, today's threat is more diffuse, and the line between legitimate and
illegitimate technical capability is no longer so clear. In addition, the
West has many fewer resources to invest due to the global economic downturn.
In this environment, full commitment of all countries that benefit from
nuclear and biological advances will be required to assure the safety and
security of all. Technical cooperation can continue to play an important
role, but with some significant changes: First, challenges should be defined
from a local perspective to ensure full commitment and participation.
Second, the goal of cooperation should shift from preventing specific
threats to building general capabilities to respond to a broad range of
challenges as they arise. Finally, the funding model for technical
cooperation should move from contractual arrangements to mutual investment
and partnership, with regional approaches encouraged to add credibility,
increase available resources, and help to ensure broad support.
To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2012.APR.B6.1