2008 APS April Meeting and HEDP/HEDLA Meeting
Volume 53, Number 5
Friday–Tuesday, April 11–15, 2008;
St. Louis, Missouri
Session S6: FPS/FHP Awards Session
1:30 PM–4:30 PM,
Monday, April 14, 2008
Hyatt Regency St. Louis Riverfront (formerly Adam's Mark Hotel),
Room: St. Louis H
Sponsoring
Units:
FPS FHP
Chair: Lawrence Krauss, Case Western Reserve University
Abstract ID: BAPS.2008.APR.S6.5
Abstract: S6.00005 : Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Nuclear disarmament after the cold war
3:54 PM–4:30 PM
Preview Abstract
Abstract
Author:
Pavel Podvig
(Stanford University)
Now that the cold war is long over, our thinking of nuclear
weapons and the
role that they play in international security has undergone
serious changes.
The emphasis has shifted from superpower confrontation to nuclear
proliferation, spread of weapon materials, and to the dangers of
countries
developing nuclear weapon capability under a cover of a civilian
program. At
the same time, the old cold-war dangers, while receded, have not
disappeared
completely. The United States and Russia keep maintaining
thousands of
nuclear weapons in their arsenals, some of them in very high
degree of
readiness. This situation presents a serious challenge that the
international community has to deal with.
Although Russia and the United States are taking some steps to
reduce their
nuclear arsenals, the traditional arms control process has
stalled -- the
last treaty that was signed in 2002 does not place serious limits on
strategic forces of either side. The START Treaty, which provides a
framework for verification and transparency in reduction of nuclear
arsenals, will expire at the end of 2009. Little effort has been
undertaken
to extend the treaty or renegotiate it. Moreover, in recent years
Russia has
stepped up the efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces.
The United
States has resisted joining the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty and
has been working on controversial new nuclear weapon development
programs.
The U.S. missile defense program makes the dialogue between
Russia and the
United States even more difficult. The reluctance of Russia and
the United
States to engage in a discussion about drastic reductions of
their nuclear
forces undermines the case of nuclear nonproliferation and seriously
complicated their effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapon
technologies and expertise.
One of the reasons for the current lack of progress in nuclear
disarmament
is the contradiction between the diminished role that nuclear
weapons play
in security of nuclear weapon states and the inertia of cold-war
institutions that are involved in their development and support.
Dealing
with this contradiction would require development of new
mechanisms of
cooperation between nuclear weapons states and their strong
commitment to
the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. One important area of
cooperation is
development of a framework that would prevent the spread of nuclear
materials and technology at the time when increasing number of
countries is
turning toward expanded use of nuclear power to cover their
energy needs.
To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2008.APR.S6.5