2008 APS April Meeting and HEDP/HEDLA Meeting
Volume 53, Number 5
Friday–Tuesday, April 11–15, 2008;
St. Louis, Missouri
Session L6: Nuclear Forensics
1:30 PM–3:18 PM,
Sunday, April 13, 2008
Hyatt Regency St. Louis Riverfront (formerly Adam's Mark Hotel),
Room: Promenade D
Sponsoring
Unit:
FPS
Chair: Charles Ferguson
Abstract ID: BAPS.2008.APR.L6.2
Abstract: L6.00002 : Nuclear Forensics: Report of the AAAS/APS Working Group
2:06 PM–2:42 PM
Preview Abstract
Abstract
Author:
Benn Tannenbaum
(AAAS)
This report was produced by a Working Group of the American Physical
Society's Program on Public Affairs in conjunction with the American
Association for the Advancement of Science Center for Science, Technology
and Security Policy. The primary purpose of this report is to provide the
Congress, U.S. government agencies and other institutions involved in
nuclear forensics with a clear unclassified statement of the state of the
art of nuclear forensics; an assessment of its potential for preventing and
identifying unattributed nuclear attacks; and identification of the
policies, resources and human talent to fulfill that potential.
In the course of its work, the Working Group observed that nuclear forensics
was an essential part of the overall nuclear attribution process, which aims
at identifying the origin of unidentified nuclear weapon material and, in
the event, an unidentified nuclear explosion. A credible nuclear attribution
capability and in particular nuclear forensics capability could deter
essential participants in the chain of actors needed to smuggle nuclear
weapon material or carry out a nuclear terrorist act and could also
encourage states to better secure such materials and weapons. The Working
Group also noted that nuclear forensics result would take some time to
obtain and that neither internal coordination, nor international
arrangements, nor the state of qualified personnel and needed equipment were
currently enough to minimize the time needed to reach reliable results in an
emergency such as would be caused by a nuclear detonation or the intercept
of a weapon-size quantity of material. The Working Group assesses
international cooperation to be crucial for forensics to work, since the
material would likely come from inadequately documented foreign sources. In
addition, international participation, if properly managed, could enhance
the credibility of the deterrent effect of attribution. Finally the Working
Group notes that the U.S. forensics capability involved a number of agencies
and other groups that would have to cooperate rapidly in an emergency and
that suitable exercises to ensure such cooperation were needed.
To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2008.APR.L6.2