APS March Meeting 2010
Volume 55, Number 2
Monday–Friday, March 15–19, 2010;
Portland, Oregon
Session B7: Evolutionary Dynamics
11:15 AM–2:15 PM,
Monday, March 15, 2010
Room: Portland Ballroom 254
Sponsoring
Units:
DBP GSNP
Chair: Herbert Levine, University of California, San Diego
Abstract ID: BAPS.2010.MAR.B7.1
Abstract: B7.00001 : Games microbes play: The game theory behind cooperative sucrose metabolism in yeast
11:15 AM–11:51 AM
Preview Abstract
Abstract
Author:
Jeff Gore
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
The origin of cooperation is a central challenge to our
understanding of
evolution. Microbial interactions can be manipulated in ways that
animal
interactions cannot, thus leading to growing interest in
microbial models of
cooperation and competition. In order for the budding yeast
\textit{S. cerevisiae} to grow on
sucrose, the disaccharide must first be hydrolyzed by the enzyme
invertase.
This hydrolysis reaction is performed outside of the cytoplasm in
the
periplasmic space between the plasma membrane and the cell wall.
Here we
demonstrate that the vast majority ($\sim $99{\%}) of the
monosaccharides
created by sucrose hydrolysis diffuse away before they can be
imported into
the cell, thus making invertase production and secretion a
cooperative
behavior [1]. A mutant cheater strain that does not produce
invertase is
able to take advantage of and invade a population of wildtype
cooperator
cells. However, over a wide range of conditions, the wildtype
cooperator can
also invade a population of cheater cells. Therefore, we observe
coexistence
between the two strains in well-mixed culture at steady state
resulting from
the fact that rare strategies outperform common strategies---the
defining
features of what game theorists call the snowdrift game. A simple
model of
the cooperative interaction incorporating nonlinear benefits
explains the
origin of this coexistence. Glucose repression of invertase
expression in
wildtype cells produces a strategy which is optimal for the
snowdrift
game---wildtype cells cooperate only when competing against
cheater cells.
In disagreement with recent theory [2], we find that spatial
structure
always aids the evolution of cooperation in our experimental
snowdrift game.
\\[4pt]
[1] Gore, J., Youk, H. {\&} van Oudenaarden, A., \textit{Nature
}\textbf{459}, 253 -- 256 (2009)
\\[0pt]
[2] Hauert, C. {\&} Doebeli, M., \textit{Nature} \textbf{428},
643 -- 646 (2004)
To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2010.MAR.B7.1