Bulletin of the American Physical Society
2007 APS April Meeting
Volume 52, Number 3
Saturday–Tuesday, April 14–17, 2007; Jacksonville, Florida
Session E2: Detection of Dangerous Materials |
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Sponsoring Units: DNP FPS Chair: Jennifer Wiseman, NASA Room: Hyatt Regency Jacksonville Riverfront Grand 1 |
Saturday, April 14, 2007 3:30PM - 4:06PM |
E2.00001: Overview of Some New Techniques for Inspection: Using 1950's Physics to Solve Modern Problems Invited Speaker: The goal of any inspection technique is to non-intrusively determine the presence of such materials in a manner which is consistent with not interrupting the normal scheme of commerce and which, at the same time, exhibits a high probability of detection and a low probability of false alarms. A great deal of work has been reported in the literature on neutron based techniques for the detection of explosives with by far the largest impetus coming from the requirements of the commercial aviation industry for the inspection of luggage and, to a lesser extent, cargo; for baggage, the major techniques are either x-ray based or are chemical trace detection methods which look for small traces of explosive residues. Nuclear techniques have been proposed for the detection of explosives and contraband for a number of years due to their ability to penetrate shielding and to identify the elemental composition of materials, thus leading to enhanced detection probability and lower false alarm rates. Nuclear techniques are virtually the only method which can both detect and identify the presence of fissile materials, either in the form of bulk material or assembled weapons. Some examples of current work in nuclear based systems currently under development will be discussed such as nuclear resonance radiography, nuclear resonance fluorescence, pulsed fast neutron analysis and pulsed photonuclear detection. The physical basis of these techniques is well known, the physics having been studied in the 1950's, but there remain limitations on current technology with respect to e.g. radiation sources and detectors and data acquisition methods. Accelerator-based systems often are large and are often not well suited for field use; radiation detectors often suffer from limited count rate ability, low sensitivity and poor energy resolution and data acquisition and analysis methods usually rely on analog techniques which are not always stable in field operation. Current research in basic physics has resulted in the development of new accelerators, radiation detectors and data acquisition electronics which may help to overcome these limitations. [Preview Abstract] |
Saturday, April 14, 2007 4:06PM - 4:42PM |
E2.00002: Progress in Nuclear Detection Invited Speaker: The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has been tasked by the Department of Homeland Security to ensure the United States remains safe from terrorist attacks using a nuclear or radiological device. To this end, the DNDO has developed, and continues to enhance, the global nuclear detection architecture and improve the domestic system used to detect and report attempts to illicitly import or transport a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material. This talk summarizes the DNDO's technology development strategy and highlights its near term and long term research and development activities to enhance the domestic nuclear detection system. Technologies discussed will include examples across the entire development cycle including spectroscopic portals, dual energy radiography, Compton imagers, nanocomposite scintillators, photofission, and nuclear resonance fluorescence. [Preview Abstract] |
Saturday, April 14, 2007 4:42PM - 5:18PM |
E2.00003: An Assessment of the Detection of Highly Enriched Uranium and its Use in an Improvised Nuclear Device using the Monte Carlo Computer Code MCNP-5 Invited Speaker: In 2002 and again in 2003, an investigative journalist unit at ABC News transported a 6.8 kilogram metallic slug of depleted uranium (DU) via shipping container from Istanbul, Turkey to Brooklyn, NY and from Jakarta, Indonesia to Long Beach, CA. Targeted inspection of these shipping containers by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel, included the use of gamma-ray imaging, portal monitors and hand-held radiation detectors, did not uncover the hidden DU. Monte Carlo analysis of the gamma-ray intensity and spectrum of a DU slug and one consisting of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) showed that DU was a proper surrogate for testing the ability of DHS to detect the illicit transport of HEU. Our analysis using MCNP-5 illustrated the ease of fully shielding an HEU sample to avoid detection. The assembly of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) -- a crude atomic bomb -- from sub-critical pieces of HEU metal was then examined via Monte Carlo criticality calculations. Nuclear explosive yields of such an IND as a function of the speed of assembly of the sub-critical HEU components were derived. A comparison was made between the more rapid assembly of sub-critical pieces of HEU in the ``Little Boy'' (Hiroshima) weapon's gun barrel and gravity assembly (i.e., dropping one sub-critical piece of HEU on another from a specified height). Based on the difficulty of detection of HEU and the straightforward construction of an IND utilizing HEU, current U.S. government policy must be modified to more urgently prioritize elimination of and securing the global inventories of HEU. [Preview Abstract] |
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